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I. Introduction
Before 1993 software was generally considered to be unpatentable
subject matter and the pr otection of software innovations was limited to
copyright and trade secrets law. But in late 1993, the Federal Circuit in In
re Alappat recognized for the f irst time that software-implemented
inventions could constitute patent eligible subject matter. Fueled by the
Internet boom in the late 1990s, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) started issuing software patents in earnest and the Federal
Circuit ultimately upheld the patentabilty of software-implemented business
method in its seminal decision in State Street. During the subsequent decade,
tens of thou sands of business method patents were granted. But the
newfound patentability of software was also met with increasing criticism of
the quality of the patents granted by the PTO. To make matters worse, a new
class of patent asserters, disparagingly referred to as “patent trolls,” began
enforcing business method patents in increasing numbers, often using the
cost of litigation as leverage to extract royalty payments from Internet
companies. By the time of the financial crisis at the end of the last decade,
patent reform efforts targeting patent trolls and their favorite tool, business
method patents, were in full swing. The se efforts ultimately led to the
enactment of the America Invents Act (“AIA”) in 2012 that introduced new
tools to challenge business method patents before the PTO. In parallel, the
In Re Bilski case made its way through the courts, ultimately reaching the
Supreme Court. I n that case, patentability of business methods narrowly
survived by a 5-4 vote. Yet, the table was set for ending the era of business
method patents. In subsequent decisions in Mayo and, ultimately, Alice, the
Supreme Court clarified its precedent on the exception to patent eligibility
for abstract ideas, effectively eliminating patent protection for business
method patents. But the impact of Alice went far beyond business method;
subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit and the lower courts have
applied the Alice test to all types of software patents, creating a much more
restrictive set of rules for patent eligibility of software implemented
inventions. This article traces the evolution of the rules for software patent
eligibility from Alappat to Alice and then analyzes the current state of the
law in light of the F ederal Circuit post-Alice decisions and its pote ntial
impact on the intellectual property protection for software going forward.
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II. Background
U.S. Patent Act, 35. U.S.C. § 101, defines the subject matter eligible for
patent protection:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of m atter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.1

The statute recites four categories of patent-eligible subject matter:
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.2 The
Supreme Court has identified three categories of subjec t matter that are
unpatentable, namely laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas: “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools
of scientific and technological work.”3 The “monopolization of those tool s
through the grant of a patent might tend to im pede innovation more
than it would tend to promote it.”4 However, “too broad an interpretation
of this exclusionary principle would eviscerate patent law” as “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”5
The Supreme Court has held that mathematical algorithms, for example,
are not patentable subject matter to the extent that they are merely
abstract ideas.6 Sim ply stated, the Diehr Court held that certain types of
mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than
abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application.
A. Alappat: Software Implemented Inventions Could Be Patent Eligible

In In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit ruled that the claimed subject
matter was patentable rejecting the PTO’s argument that it was not because
it still “read on” a general purpose computer even though it was programmed
to perform according to the subject claim.7 The Alappat invention related
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
Id.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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to a means for creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope,
that is, a m eans to illuminate pixels on a sc reen that will eliminate any
apparent discontinuity, jaggedness, or oscillation in the waveform, thus
giving the visual appearance of a sm ooth continuous waveform. The
PTO rejected the inv ention because the challen ged method claim was
directed towards nonstatutory subject matter under the mathematical
algorithm exception to Section 101.8 When Alappat was decided, courts
were applying some variation of the Freeman-Walter two-part test
developed in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to determine
whether any part of a claim recites mathematical subject matter.9 Under
Freeman-Walter, courts (1) analyze whether a mathematical algorithm is
directly or indirectly recited, and (2) if a mathematical algorithm is found,
whether the claim as a whole applies the algorithm in any manner to physical
elements or process steps.10 G uided by Freeman-Walter, the Alappat
majority held:
[T]he proper inquiry in dealing with t he so c alled mathematical
subject matter exception of § 101 alleged herein is to see whether the
claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical
concept, whether categorized as a m
athematical formula,
mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in
essence represents nothing more than a “law of nature,” “natural
phenomenon,” or “abstract idea.” If so, Diehr precludes the patenting
of that subject matter.11

For Alappat, the F ederal Circuit did not f ind a “disembodied
mathematical concept which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’
but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible
result.”12 F urthermore, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the PTO’s
reasoning that the challenged claim was unpatentable because it “ reads on
a general purpose digital computer ‘means’ to perform the va rious steps
under program control,” that is, a programmed general purpose computer

8. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65 (defining “mathematical algorithm” as a “procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical program”).
9. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
10. Id. at 1544 (citing In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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performing steps of a method.13 Instead, the Federal Circuit held that “such
programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer
in effect becomes a spec ial purpose computer once it is programmed to
perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program
software.”14 Consequently, a “computer operating pursuant to software may
represent patentable subject matter,” for example, in Alappat, where the
physical structure (i.e., the computer) used a mathematical algorithm (i.e.,
the programmed software) to transform the display screen in to a state that
created smooth waveforms rather than jagged ones.15
B. State Street: Abstract Concepts Transformed or Performed By a
Machine

The Federal Circuit attempted to define the scope of the Supreme
Court’s “practical application” requirement in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc. holding that Section 101 allowed claims on
mathematical algorithms that produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible
result.”16 In so ho lding, it affirmed the patentability of patent claims for a
computerized system that allowed an administrator of a hedge fund/
investment firm to manage multiple mutual funds in a single account, to
monitor and record financial information among numerous stock portfolios,
and to quickly calculate certain values, such as the value of the shares to
the nearest penny. To the Federal Circuit, the patented invention
represented:
the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful,
concrete and tangible result’ — a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied
upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.17

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1544–45.
Id. at 1545.
Id.
State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Group., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id.
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In short, the State Street Bank decision found mathematical algorithms, an
abstract concept, patentable if “transformed” or “performed” by a machine
and which provided “useful, concrete, and tangible” results.
Decided in the midst of the dot.com or Internet bubble, the State Street
Bank decision caused a rush to the PTO ushering in a generation of business
method patents, Internet patents, and software patents. The PTO classifies
these patents under Class 705, which is a “generic class for apparatus and
corresponding methods for performing data processing operations, in which
there is a significant change in the data or f or performing calculation
operations wherein the apparatus or method is uniquely designed for or
utilized in the practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or
in the processing of financial data.” Applications for Class 705 patents,
especially business method patents involving e-commerce, increased from
1,320 in 1998 to nearly 8,000 by 2001.18 Statistics maintained by the PTO
further illustrate the astounding increase in business method and Internet
patent applications and their issuance:19
Year

Class 705

Class 705 CPA-RCE-

Class 705 Total

Class 705

Serialized Filings

R129 Filings

Filings

Issues

2002

6,774

626

7400

494

2003

6,387

1,310

7,697

486

2004

6,681

1,731

8,412

291

2005

6,976

2,056

9,032

711

2006

8,352

2,532

10,884

1,195

2007

9,843

2,925

12,778

1,333

2008

10,293

4,234

14,527

1,643

2009

8,229

7,160

15,389

1,725

2010

8,495

8,736

17,231

3,649

18. Starling Hunter, Have Business Method Patents Gotten a Bum Rap? Some Empirical
Evidence, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 1, 2 (2003), http://ebusiness.mit.edu/
research/papers/182_hunter_method_patents.pdf.
19. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Class 705 Application Filing and Patents
Issued Data (2011), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patentapplications/utility-patent/business-methods-18.
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C. Bilski: “Process” Under Section 101

In the Fall of 2008 the Federal Circuit In re Bilski, clarified the standards
applicable in determining whether a claimed method constitutes a statutory
“process” under Section 101.20 The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) of in eligibility and
summarized the essence of the claimed method as follows:
In essence, the claim is for a method of hedging risk in the field of
commodities trading. [. . .] The claimed method envisions an
intermediary, the “commodity provider,” that sells coal to the power
plants at a fixed price, thus isolating the power plants from the
possibility of a spike in demand increasing the price of coal above the
fixed price. The same provider buys coal from mining companies at
a second fixed price, thereby isolating the mining companies from the
possibility that a drop in demand would lower prices below that fixed
price. And the provider has thus hedged its risk; if demand and prices
skyrocket, it has sold coal at a disadvantageous price but has bought
coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and prices
fall. Importantly, however, the claim is not limited to transactions
involving actual commodities, and the application discloses that the
recited transactions may simply involve options, i.e., rights to
purchase or sell the commodity at a particular price within a particular
timeframe.21

Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s summary of the claimed method
highlights why such claims should n ot be patented as it describes not a
machine, manufacture or composition of matter or a ne w and useful
process, but a “transformation of ‘non-physical financial risks and legal
liabilities of the commodity provider, the consumer, and the market
participants.’”22 Sta ted differently, the claimed method was simply a
computerized manifestation or representation of fundamental principles
concerning financial risk and legal liabilities. A monopoly on such a
claim would “pre-empt[ ] all uses of [that] fundamental principle in all
fields,” a clue indicating that the claim is not limited to a particular
application of the principle.23 That the claimed method was performed on
computer was not enough to save it because “extra-solution activity” and
20. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949.
21. Id. at 950.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 957; see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193, (abstract ideas are not patentable until reduced to
some type of practical application).
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“insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process.”24
In re Bilski set forth the machine-or-transformation test previously
articulated in State Street. Under this test, an applicant may show that a
process claim satisfies §101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a
particular machine, or by showing that the claim transforms an article.25 The
machine-part of the test requires that the “use of a specific machine or
transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s
scope” and “must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity.”26
The transformation part of the test states that a process is patent-eligible if it
“transforms an article into a different state or thing” whe re the
transformation is “ central to the purpose of the claimed process.”27 The
Federal Circuit reiterated the traditional transformations of physical objects,
substances and raw materials through chemical processes or other physical
acts. It also acknowledged the fact that the “raw materials of many
information-age processes, however, are electronic signals and
electronically-manipulated data,” including, for example, the business
methods for “manipulat[ing] [ ] even more abstract constructs such as legal
obligations, organizational relationships, and business risks.”28 But without
further discussion on the transformation and/or use of raw materials of the
information age, the Federal Circuit simply stated “that future developments
in technology and the sciences may present difficult challenges to the
machine-or-transformation test,”29 leaving those challenges to the Supreme
Court.
For now, in articulating this machine-to-transformation test, the Federal
Circuit concluded, “[s]o long as the claimed process is limited to a practical
application of a fundamental principle to transform specific data, and the
claim is limited to a visual depiction that represents specific physical objects
24. Id. (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 ( 1978)
(“The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”); In
re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding a simple recordation step in the middle of
the claimed process incapable of imparting patent-eligibility under § 101); In re Grams, 888 F.2d
835, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding a presolution step of gathering data incapable of
imparting patent-eligibility under § 101).
25. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 956.
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or substances, there is no danger that the scope of the claim would wholly
pre-empt all uses of the principle.”30
Judge Newman dissented, accusing the majority of “redefining the
word ‘process’ in the patent statute, to exclude all processes that do not
transform physical matter or that are not performed by machines” with little
regard for its impact on the future or the “ thousands of patents already
granted.” 31 He argued that such exclusion precludes inventions that “apply
today’s electronic and photonic technologies, as well as other processes that
handle data and information in novel ways.”32 According to Judge Newman,
neither statute nor Supreme Court precedent supported the majority’s
opinion that transformation of physical state is a requirement of eligibility
set by Section 101 unless a machine performs the process.
The Supreme Court reversed holding that Federal Circuit’s machineor-transformation test was not the sole test to be used for determining the
patentability of a “process” under Section 101.33 Nothing in Section 100(b)
of the Patent Act requires “process, art or method” to transform an article
or be tied to a m achine. The Federal Circuit’s adoption of the machineor-transformation test as the sole te st for what constitutes a “process”
violated principles of statutory construction because it allowed an
interpretation that was beyond the ordinary, contemporary and common
meaning of the term “process.”
However, rather than wholly dismissing the machine-or-transformation
test, the Supreme Court considered it a n important clue or investigative
tool for determining patentability. But this tool was unnecessary to render
the claimed patent unpatentable. In Bilski, the representative claims
described a “fundamental economic practice” and reduced it to a
mathematical formula.34 Thus, as prior precedence has established, even if
a process or practice was tied to a machine or transforming an article,
Section 101 still does not capture “fundamental economic practice[s] long
prevalent in our system of commerce.”35 According to the Supreme Court,
the claims were merely a recitation of an ineligible concept.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 963.
Id. at 976 (Newman J., dissenting).
Id. (Newman J., dissenting).
Bilski v Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-04 (2010).
Id. at 611.
Id.
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D. Congressional Response to Patents Related to Financial Products or
Services

Meanwhile, Congress was trying to resolve the overwhelming number
of business method patents by creating procedures for their review. The
America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexaminations with three new
proceedings: inter partes review (“IPR”), covered business method patent
review (“CBM”), and post-grant review.
Congressional debates made clear that this new CBM review procedure
was targeting the type of abstract patents that the Supreme Court had
oscillated about. 36 Indeed, when asked by Senator Mark Pryor to clarify the
purpose of the Schumer-Kyl program in the America Invents Act, Senator
Patrick responded:
The Schumer-Kyl program addresses certain business method
patents and does not target any specific patents. The Schumer-Kyl
program is intended to provide a cost-effective alternative to
litigation to examine business-method patents.37

Senator Pryor followed up with a pointed question as to whether this
new provision of the America Invents Act “[was] simply trying to address
the problem of business method patents of du bious validity that are
commonly associated with the Federal Circuit’s 1998 decision in State Street
Bank v. Signature?”38 To which, Senator Leahy responded:
That is correct. It is still unclear whether the subject matter of these
patents qualifies as patentable subject matter under current law.
Patents of low quality and dubious validity, as you know, are a drag
on innovation because they grant a monopoly right for an invention
that should not be entitled to one under the patent law.39

Congress’s response to the threat of invalid business method patents and
their strain on the economy was to enact a “transitional program” called the
Covered Business Method Review.40 It is transitional because this type of

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

157 CONG. REC. S1175 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2011)
Id.
Id.
Id.
AIA § 18(a)(3) (2011).
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proceeding became available in 2012 but will end on September 15, 2020.41
Under this adversarial proceeding, an accused infringer can participate after
the filing of the petition for review of a covered business patent,42 unlike the
now defunct ex parte reexamination procedures.
The procedural differences between CBM review as compared to inter
partes review highlight the low tolerance Congress apparently has for
business method patents. For example, motions to stay litigation pending
CBM reviews are more likely to be granted because courts are statutorily
required to consider four factors: (1) undue prejudice or clear tactical
advantage; (2) simplification of issues; (3) state of litigation; and (4) whether
stay (or denial) of the C MB, will in fact reduce the burden of litigation.43
Furthermore, the PTO may consider more potentially invalidating evidence.
For example, inter partes review permits challenges to patents using only
prior art patents or prior art printed publications; whereas CBM review
allows third parties to challenge issued patents related to financial products
or services using prior art patents, printed publications, and prior art systems
— permitting challenges on any ground that is a condition for patentability. 44
These requirements and pe rmissions are special to covere d business method
patents, reflecting Congress’s grievances against them: (1) business method
patents are a strain on the economy and must be stifled; and (2) allowing parties
to go first through the PTO provides the PTO an opportunity to conduct a “doover” or “fix” the fact that they issued the otherwise dubious business method
patent in the first place.
E. Mayo: The Interplay Between Novelty and Subject Matter Eligibility

On the heels of the AIA, the Supreme Court issued its 2012 decision
in Mayo.45 While it was already determined that claims setting forth laws
of nature are ineligible, the Mayo Court asked whether the claim added more
than simply “inform[ing] a relevant audience” about what they presumably

41. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(d) (2012).
42. A “covered business method” patent is defined as “a patent that claims a method or
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing operations utilized in th e practice,
administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not
include patents for technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d).
43. AIA § 18(b)(1)
44. Jason E. Stach, Exploring the Expanding Scope of Covered Business Method Reviews,
FINNEGAN INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. (Jan. 2014), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/
articlesdetail.aspx?news=64c9f230-94ab-4d99-b256-9bff462cb8e8.
45. Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1289.
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already knew, such as steps that “consist of well understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community.”46 In
Mayo, the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated a method patent
concerning a blood diagnostic test.
The Supreme Court held that the patent claimed laws of nature —
namely, the relationship between, (1) the concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and (2) the likelihood that a dosage of a drug
(thiopurine drug) will prove ineffective for a given metabolite concentration.
Claim 1, for example, states that if the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of a
patient who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug) exceed about 400 pmol
per 8×108 red blood cells, then the administered dose is likely to produce
toxic side effects. Even if the intervening act of administering the thiopurine
drug is required to trigger the side e ffect, the side e ffect itself is still a
physical manifestation of the r elationship between the drug and the
particular person in a particular metabolic state. In other words, the
relationship exists apart from any human action since it is simply a
consequence of the wa ys in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized
by the body. This, the Court determined is an entirely natural process. And
consequently, a patent that simply describes such natural processes,
including its relation to the physical world (i.e., its interaction with the
human body) is ineligible subject matter. With Mayo, the Supreme Court
“set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.”47

III. “Alice: “Significantly More” to Qualify as an “Inventive
Concept”
The rule against patenting an abstract idea, mathematical algorithms, or
a law of nature was not new when Mayo was decided in 2012. When such
abstract concepts are wrapped about a machine or built into a process, Mayo
asked what more did the claim add to the relevant field?48 Does the alleged
invention simply add steps that “consist of well understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community?”49

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1298.
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
Id.
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In late 2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the guidelines set forth in
Mayo vis-à-vis Section 101 patentability in its opinion concerning the
eligibility of a computer-based patent.50 The Supreme Court “set forth a
framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.”51 That two-step framework is as follows:
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is
there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, we consider
the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered
combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform
the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application.
We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an
‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements
that is ‘ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’52

Specifically, Alice reaffirmed the two step framework espoused in
Mayo for determining patentability: (1) whether the claim is dir ected to
an abstract idea; and (2) if an abstract idea is present in the claim,
determining whether any part of the claim amounts to signif icantly more
than the abstract idea to qualify as an “inventive concept.” If not, the claim
is deemed patent ineligible.
The Supreme Court found Alice’s patents unpatentable because the
patents did not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract concept of
managing risk by using a generic computer. In so holding, however, Alice
left open the nature of the technological improvement that must exist before
an application of an abstract concept may be patentable as “inventive.”
A. Federal Circuit Cases Decided in the Immediate Aftermath of Alice

The Federal Circuit’s application of Alice provides some guidance to
the conundrums discussed above. The patent in Digitech v. Electronics for
Imaging, concerned a process for creating an “improved device profile” that
described the color and spatial properties of imaging devices that w ould
allow a more accurate translation of an image’s pixel data for use across
50.
51.
52.

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
Id.
Id.
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different digital image processing devices (i.e., digital cameras, monitors,
TVs, printers, etc.).53 In Digitech, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary
judgment of invalidity of the claim, “reciting a process of taking two data
sets and combining them into a single data set, the device profile.”54
Digitech’s argument that the claimed “device profile” is subjec t matter
eligible because it is “‘hardware or
software w ithin a digital i mage
processing system’ and exists as a tag file appended to a digital image”55
could not defeat the fact that the claims “encompass all embodiments of the
information contained in the device profile, regardlessof the process through
which this information is obtained or the physical medium in which it is
stored.”56 Alice reaffirmed that fundamental concepts are ineligible abstract
ideas. And to determine whether a pr ocess claim recites an abst ract idea
requires looking at the claim as a whole “keeping in mind that an invention
is not ineligible just because it relies upon a law of nature or mathematical
algorithm.”57 However, “[d]ata in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply
information”58 and the patented claim “recites an ineligible abstract process
of gathering and combining data that does not require input from a physical
device.”59
Judge Hughes, who was on the Digitech panel, authored anot her
decision in Planet Bingo, in which the Federal Circuit affirmed summary
judgment of invalidity of a claim directed to “managing a bingo game while
allowing a player to repeatedly pla y the same sets of num bers in multiple
sessions.”60 The claim generally recites:
storing a play er’s preferred sets of bi ngo numbers; retrieving one
such set upon demand, and playing that set; while simultaneously
tracking the player’s sets, tracking player payments, and verifying
winning numbers.61

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Digitech v. Electronics for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1349–50.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id. at 1351.
Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x. 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
Id. at 1006.
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The district court conclu ded that the method claims enco mpass the
abstract idea of managing and playing the game of Bingo and t hat the “use
of a computer in the method claims ‘adds nothing more than t he ability to
manage . . . Bingo more efficiently.’”62 And as the district court correctly
concluded, managing a game of Bingo “consists solely of mental steps which
can be carried out by a human using pen and paper.”63
In affirming the invalidity of the patent, the Federal Circuit rejected two
arguments by plaintiff. First, because the claimed invention at most required
two sets of Bingo numbers, a pla yer and a m anager, the Federa l Circuit
rejected plaintiff’s argument that “‘in real world use, literally thousands, if
not millions of preselected Bingo num bers are handled by the claimed
computer program,’ making it impossible for the invention to be carried out
manually.”64 Second, because the claimed invention recited a program
requiring generic functions of storing, retrieving, and verifying a chosen set
of bingo numbers against a winning set of bingo numbers, the Federal Circuit
rejected plaintiff’s argument that the accounting, ticketing, and verification
programs included in the Bingo program offered, added “significantly more”
than an abstract idea requirement.65
Two observations follow from these rejections: First, even though the
real world product itself may contain more complex or possibly inventive
features, this offers no reprieve to the patent holder who opted f or broader
patent claims. Second, the Federal Circuit refused to address how a“claimed
invention requiring m any transactions might tip the scale s of patent
eligibility.”66 In other words, would a patent that requires a co mputer’s
ability to make thousands of co mputations where such computations could
not be mentally performed or carried out by a human using pen and paper
with comparable accuracy and speed, pass Alice muster? The Court in
Planet Bingo left this scenario unanswered.
A couple of weeks after the decision in Planet Bingo was reached, the
Federal Circuit affirmed that a patent “directed
to creating fam iliar
commercial arrangements by use of computers and networks” was ineligible

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1006 (citing Planet Bingo v. VKGS, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 840, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2013)).
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1008.
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under Section 101.67 The first clai m is an independent clai m reciting a
method in which:
(1) a computer operated by the provider of a safe transaction service
receives a request for a performance guarantee for an “ online
commercial transaction”; (2) the computer processes the request by
underwriting the requesting party in order to provide the transaction
guarantee service; and (3) the c omputer offers, via a “computer
network,” a transaction guaranty that binds to the transaction upon
the closing of the transaction.68

The district court conclude d that the patent “describes a well-known,
and widely understood concept — at third part y guarantee of a sales
transaction — and then applied that concept using conventional computer
technology and the Internet.”69 Despite the “ancient lineage” of the claimed
concept, i.e., creating a contractual relationship, the method claim may have
still been patent eligible had its i nvocation of computers added something
“inventive.”70 But it did not. The district court found, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed, that the paten ted invention did not require “any specific
programming” and was not “tied to a ny particular machine.”71 In fact,
according to the court, the claimed invention required nothing more than the
“basic function of any general purpose computer.”72 That the claims required
the transactions to be conducted online was ins ufficient to sa ve the claim
because that merely applied the otherwise ancient and abstract concept to a
“particular technological environment” (that is, the Internet).73
In buySAFE, the Federal Circuit concluded that it i s not enou gh that
“the transactions being guaranteed are themselves online trans actions”

67. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
68. Id. at 1351.
69. Id. at 1352. (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 331, 335–36 (D.Del.
2013)); see also, Accenture Global Servs. GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 134445 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“generalized software components arranged to implement an abstract concept
[of generating insurance-policy-related tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence
of an event] on a computer”); Bancorp Servs. LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US), 687 F.3d
1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the computer “employed only for its most basic function, the
performance of repetitive calculations” to implement the idea of managing a life insurance policy).
70. Id. at 1354–55.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1352.
73. Id. at 1355.
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because, at best, that was simply an “attempt[] to limit the use” of the abstract
guarantee idea “to a particular technological environment.”74
On November 14, 2014, the Federal Circuit reached a decision in
Ultramerical, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC that expounded on the concept of providing
familiar transactions over the Internet. In Ultramerical, the plaintiff sued
Hulu, LLC ( “Hulu”), YouTube, LLC ( “YouTube”), and WildTa ngent for
infringement of a patent by distributing copyrighted media products over the
Internet, where the consumer rec eives the copyrighted media at no cost in
exchange for viewing an advertisement.75 After Hulu and YouTube were
dismissed, WildTangent fi led for motion to dism iss for failure to state a
claim, arguing that the asserted patent was ineligible subject matter, which
the district court granted. In the first r ound of appeal, the Federal Circuit
reversed the order only to be vacated by the Supreme Court and re manded
for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in
Mayo Collaborative. On remand, the Federal Circuit again concluded that the
district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss under Section 101, and
again WildTangent appealed. While the petition for certiorari was pending, the
Supreme Court issued Alice, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and
remanded it in light of Alice.
In Ultramerical, the court distilled the heart of the asserted patent as an
idea to “use [an ] advertisement as an exchange or currency,” “having no
particular concrete or tangible form ” and “devoid of a concrete or tangible
application.”76 This was ste p one in the Alice analysis. The second step in
the analysis considers the alleged novelty in implementing the abstract idea,
that is, whether the claims do “significantly more” (i.e., “inventive concept”)
than simply describe the abstract idea or method. Here,Ultramerical argued
that the asserted claims are “directed to a specific method of advertisement
and content distribution that was previously unknown and never em ployed
on the I nternet before.” But the Fede ral Circuit rejected this argum ent
ultimately finding nothing inventive about how t he idea was i mplemented.
Even Ultramerical’s invocation of the Internet did not save the claims from
invalidity:
Given the prevalence of the Internet, implementation of an abstract
idea on the Internet i n this case is not sufficient to provide any

74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1354–55.
Ultramerical, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 715–16.
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‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’77

The Supreme Court articu lated the pol icy against monopolizing the
basic tools of scientific and technological work.78 The basic tools of modern
day commercial and soc ial interaction, therefore, include the generic
computer and the Internet, which hav e become “indispensable staples of
contemporary life.”79
Judge Mayer’s concurrence in Ultramerical, while not binding, not only
emphasized Federal court’s wavering deference to the Patent Office,
particularly with regard to business method patents, but described a rule he
refers to as the “tech
nological arts test” to distinguish
between
“entrepreneurial” versus “technologi cal” innovation — an approach so me
have characterized as a “ more thoughtful effort to ide ntify where t he line
would be drawn and why.”80
Referring to Section 101 as the “gateway to the Patent Act,” Judge
Mayer argues that determining patent eligibility “bears some hallmarks of a
jurisdictional inquiry,” requiring earl y determination or risk tur ning any
decision on validity or infringement into an i mpermissible advisory
opinion.81 Further more, addressing patent eligibility at the outset of
litigation, according to Judge Mayer, “provides a bulwark against vexatious
infringement suits,” calling out “[t]hose who own vague and overbroad
business method patents [that] often file ‘nearly identical patent infringement
complaints against a plethora of diverse defendants,’ and then ‘demand . . .
a quick settle ment at a price far lo wer than the cost to
defend the
litigation.’”82 Going hand in hand with discouraging vexatious litigation, is
the public interest in eliminating defective patents that would otherwise stifle
innovation.83

77. Id. at 716 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
78. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
79. Ultramerical, 772 F.3d at 723 (Mayer, J., concurring).
80. Guy W. Chambe rs, Ultramerical V. Hulu: The Guillotine For Patent Trolls, LAW360
(Dec. 8, 2014, 10:17 AM) , http://www.law360.com/articles/601967/ultramercial-v-hulu-theguillotine-for-patent-trolls.
81. Ultramerical, 772 F.3d at 718 (Mayer, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 719 (citing Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see
Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Has Delaware Become the “New” Eastern District of Texas? The
Unforeseen Consequences of the AIA, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 527 (2014).
83. Id.
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For some time, these ineligible defective patents enjoyed a presumption
of Section 101 eligibility because they were approved by the Patent Office in
its expertise. But, according to J udge Mayer, there should be no deference
because the Patent Office has, for m any years, applied an “insufficiently
rigorous subject matter eligibility standard,”84 as opposed to the current standard
whose rigor the Supreme Court has confirmed through Alice, Myriad, Mayo,
and Bilski. In Judge Mayer’s view, claims directed to a n entrepreneurial
objective, i.e., business method patents, are not only impermissibly abstract, but
do not live up to the constitutional requirement that patent monopoly serve; “[t]o
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.”85 Judge Mayer articulated a
test that he believed respected constitutional standards as well as Supreme Court
scriptures under Alice and Bilski:
[c]laims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an
entrepreneurial objective, such as methods for in creasing revenue,
minimizing economic risk, or struct uring commercial transactions,
rather than a technological one.86

Under Judge Mayer’s “technological arts” test, claims must: (1) Harness
natural laws and scien tific principles; (2) Use them to solve seemingly
intractable problems; (3) Describe a technological objective; and (4) Set out a
precise set of instructions for achieving said technological objective.
The requirement that precise implementation instructions be disclosed
serves to “confine the reach of a patent, ensuring that the scope of the claims
is commensurate with their technological disclosure.” 87 One commentator
has referred to Judge Mayer’s concurrence as a “stronger doctrinal departure
from the Alice-Mayo framework.”88 Indeed, applying Judge Mayer’s
“technological arts” test would invariably put most if not all business method
patents at risk of invalidity under Section 101.

84. Id. at 720.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
86. Ultramerical, 772 F.3d at 721 (Mayer. J., concurring).
87. Id. at 722; cf 35 U.S.C. §112 (2012) (requiring a written description, enablement, a nd
definiteness).
88. Farabow Henderson, Patent Eligibility in the Wake of Alice: Ultramerical III, FINNEGAN (Dec.
4, 2014), http://www.finnegan.com/PatentEligibilityintheWakeofAliceUltramericalIII/.
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IV. The DDR Holdings Decision
In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, the majority affirmed the validity
of two patents for webpage-display technology.89 The patents were directed
to systems and methods of “generating a composite web page that combines
certain visual ele ments of a ‘host’ website with content of a t hird-party
merchant,”90 preventing the host’s website visitor from being lured onto the
website of the third-party merchant. According the patentee, typically, when
a visitor is on a host webpage and activates a hyperlink for an advertisement,
the visitor is “instantly transported away from the host’s website aft er
‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.”91 The patented
invention alters that “rou tine” process such that the visitor is no longer
transported to the third-party merchant’s website upon clicking the
hyperlinked advertisement.92 This, according to the majority, represented a
patentable idea bec ause the claims “specify how i nteractions with the
Internet are manipulated to yield the desired result — a result that overrides
the routine and conventional sequence of events ordin arily triggered by the
click of a hyperlink.”93 Unlike in Ultramercial, the claims did not “merely
recite the performance of som e business practice known from the preInternet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet.” 94
Rather, DDR’s patents presented an d addressed a “business challenge
(retaining website visitors),” a cha llenge particular to the I nternet.95 The
solution also defied the conventional ways the Internet is understood to work.
Judge Mayer wrote a dissenting o pinion, stating that the patents were
ineligible because it addressed an entrepreneurial problem and, thus,
provided an entrepreneurial solution to be performed on the Internet. For
example, Judge Mayer characterized the patents as “simply tak[ing] a wellknown and widely applied business practice and applying it using a generic
computer and the Internet. The idea of having a ‘store within a store’ was in
widespread use well befor e the dawn of e-co mmerce.”96 But the majority
disagreed. Instead, the majority picked up on the “ephemeral nature of

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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Internet location and the near-instantaneous transport between locations
made possible by standard Internet protocols,” and analogized the inventive
concept of the patents to being “suddenly and completely transported” from
one place (the host store) and being “relocated to a separate phy sical venue
associated with the third party.”97 Even the inventor’s acknowledgement that
the “innovative aspect of his claimed invention was ‘[t]aking something that
worked in the real world and doi ng it on the Internet,”98 did not jeopardize
its status at being patent-eligible subject matter.
A. Federal Circuit Decisions After DDR Holdings

Before the year’s end, the Federal Circuit heard and decided one more
case applying the Mayo/Alice’s two-step framework. In Content Extraction
& Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a patent infringement case filed by
Content Extraction and Transmission LLC (“CET”). Without discovery or
claim construction, the dis trict court found the asserted patents invalid as
patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101, and dismissed the allegations at the
pleading stage.99 The patented technology is designed for ATMs, it permits
the ATM to recognize infor mation written on a scanned check, such as the
check’s amount, and populate certain data fields with that inform ation in a
computer’s memory.100
Viewed from a conceptual level, the court described the asserted claims
as generally reciting a method of 1) extracting data from hard copy documents
using an automated digitizing unit such as a scanner, and 2) recognizing specific
information from the extracted data, and storing that information in a computer’s
memory.101 In determining that the claims are drawn from abstract ideas, the
court stated that the concept of “data collection, recognition, and storage is
undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have alway s performed these
functions.”102 CET argued that the asserted claims are not drawn to an abstract
idea because the claims require a computer and a scanner and “human minds are

97. Id. at 1258.
98. Id. at 1265.
99. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
100. Id. at 1345.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1347.
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unable to process and recognize the stream of bits output by a scanner.”103 These
arguments were rejected.
The Federal Circuit also agreed that the patented claims disclosed no
“inventive concept” — a conclusion supported by CET’s concession at oral
argument that the “use of a scanner or other digitizing device to extract data
from a document was well-known at the time of filing, as was the ability to
use computers to tra nslate the shapes of a physical page into typeface
characters.”104 At most, the patent disclosed the implementation of an
abstract idea using a scanner and computer in a “particular technological
environment” (i.e., automated teller machines).105
B. Recent Federal Circuit Cases Focusing on the First Prong of Alice

The impact concerning the ambiguity of the patentability of business
methods has cast substantial uncertainty on software patents as a whole. In
part, this is due to the fact that neither the Supreme Court, nor the Federal
Circuit has given explicit guidance on what qualifies as an abstract idea.
Instead, the only clues to the scope of the abstract idea exception to
patentability reside in the anecdotal evidence of the cases decided since
Alice. Indeed, the sole CAFC case that sustained patentability of a software
patent over a Se c. 101 challenge, DDR Holdings, did so, not because the
claims were not drawn to an abstract idea, but because the claims added
enough to the abstract idea to justify patentability. It appears that software
patents directed to performing on computer activities previously performed
by humans are unlikely to survive.
Additionally, none of the cases that survived the Alice analysis did so
based on the first prong of the analy sis, patent-eligibility was deter mined
exclusively based on the second prong. Fortunately, after nearly two years of
finding that the first prong of the Alice test was met in every case presented, the
Federal Circuit issued a series of decisions that provided more guidance on what
is not an abstract idea for purposes of an Alice analysis.
On May 12, 2016, the Federal Circuit held that software that improves
computer technology is not abstract, recognizing that “[s]oftware can make
non-abstract improvements to co mputer technology just as hardware
improvements can.”106 Enfish involved patents related to a “self-referential”

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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database that the district court found, on summary judgment, invalid under,
inter alia, Sec. 101 because the cl aims were directed to the abstract idea of
“storing, organizing, and retrieving memory in a l ogical table,” in ot her
words, “the concept of organizing information using tabular form ats.”107
The Federal Circuit disagreed, as Judge Hughes explained:
We do not read Alice to broadly hold that all improvements in
computer-related technology are in herently abstract and, therefore,
must be considered at step two. Indeed, some improvements in
computer-related technology wh en appropriately claimed are
undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display,
and the like. Nor do we t hink that claims directed to software, as
opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract and therefore only
properly analyzed at the second step of the Alice analysis. Software
can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as
hardware improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can
be accomplished through either route. We thus see no reason to
conclude that all claims directed to improvements in computerrelated technology, including those directed to software, are abstract
and necessarily analyzed at the second step of Alice, nor do we
believe that Alice so directs. Therefore, we find it relevant to ask
whether the c laims are directe d to an improvement to computer
functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea, even at the first
step of the Alice analysis.108

The Court held that the Enfish patents were not “directed to an abstract
idea within the meaning of Alice. Rather, they are directed to a specific
improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential
table.”109 For example, unlike the relational model, the patents “disclose[d]
an indexing technique that allows for faster searching of data than would be
possible with the relationship model . . . allow[ed] for more effective storage
of data other than structured text, su ch as images and unstructured text . . .
[and] more flexibility in c onfiguring the database.” 110 In other wor ds, the
Federal Circuit read the claims as not only being “directed to an
improvement to com puter functionality,” but also “to a
specific

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1333.
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implementation of a solution to a proble m in the software art s.” 111 The
Enfish patents survived.
A few weeks later, on June 27, 2016, the Federal Circuit issued another
Sec. 101 motion in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility, LLC, writing the opinion, Judge Chen (who also wrote the Federal
Circuit’s decision in DDR Holdings), vacated the district court’ s order
dismissing plaintiff’s complaint finding that the claims of the asserted patent,
U.S. Patent No. 5,987,606 were invalid as a matter of law under Sec. 101.112
The patent described its invention as “combining the advantages of the thenknown filtering tools while avoiding their drawbacks.”113 For example, the
invention avoids being “modified or thwarted by a computer literate end-user”
and “avoids being installed on and dependent on ‘individual end-user hardware
and operating systems’” or a single local area network or local server platform
by installing the filter at the ISP server.114
The patent was deemed eligible by the Federal Circuit despite its claims
involving elements known in the art. For the Federal Circuit, “an inventive
concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional pi eces.”115 Here, the patent, described a “ specific,
discrete implementation of the abstract idea of filtering content”
on th e
internet, even though filtering content on the internet was already a known
concept, the patent described how its “particular arrangement of elements is
a technical improvement over prior art way s of filtering such content.” 116
This, according to the Federal Circuit is patentable under Sec. 101.117
Subsequently, on August 1, 2016, the Federal Circuit ruled on Electric
Power Group LLC v. Alstom S.A., here the Federal Circuit held that patents
describing systems and methods for performing real-time performance
monitoring of an electric power grid by collecting data from multiple data
sources, analyzing the data, and displaying the results to be ineligible patent
subject matter.118 Unlike the claims in Enfish, which involved improvements
to computer functionality, the assert ed claims in Electric Power were

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1338–39.
BASCOM Global Internet Services v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1344.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id.
Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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focused on independentl y abstract id eas that merely use computers as
tools.119 The Federal Circuit further noted that merely limiting such asserted
claims to the particular technological environment of power-grid monitoring
is, without more, insuffici ent to transform the claims into “patent-eligible
applications of the abstract ideas.”120 Indeed, there was nothing new about
the asserted claims: “The claims in this case do not even require a new source
or type of information, or new techniques for analyzing it.”121 Even under
the second Alice step, t he Federal Circuit observed that the clai ms’
“invocation of computers, networks, and displays,” in fact, required neither
“nonconventional computer, network, or displa y components” nor “nonconventional and non-g eneric arrangement of known, conventional
pieces.”122 In so holding, Power Electric spoke favorably about the district
court’s “common-sense distinction between ends sought an d particular
means of achieving them, between desired results (functions) and particular
ways of achieving (perfor ming) them” as a one helpful way of doublechecking patentability under Alice, specifically the Suprem e Court’s
prohibition against the pr eemptive nature of patent s.123 Judge Tarant o
reasoned that “clai ms [that are] so result-focused, so functional, as to
effectively cover any solution to an id entified problem” is more likely to
preempt innovation.124
The concern for preemption took center stage in McRO Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games America Inc., a case involvi ng patents on a utomatically
animating lip synchronization and facial expression of three-dimensional
characters. The district court invalidated the patents, finding the clai ms
“drawn to the [abstract] idea of automated rules-based use of morph targets
and delta sets for li p-synchronized three-dimensional animation.”125 First,
looking facially at the claims, the dist rict court f ound them directed to
something tangible as “each cover[ed] an approach to autom ated threedimensional computer animation, which is a specific technological
process.”126 Because the cl aims described a tangible process, the court
119. Id. at 1354.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1355.
122. Id. (cf. Enfish and BASCOM).
123. Id. at 1356.
124. Id.
125. McRO Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., No. 2015-1080, 2016 WL 4896481,
at 7 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
126. Id. at 4.
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disregarded the preem ption concern.127 Second, the court compared the
claims to the prior art that the patent s ought to improve in an attempt to
“factor out conventional activity.”128 In the prior art, facial expressions and
lip synchronizations were done manually with the help of a computer. The
animator, using a com puter, would manually determine the ap propriate
modification to be performed on a character model at certain important times
or “keyframes.”129 Here, the patents aimed to automate the 3-D animator’s
tasks by “providing an integrated method embodied in co mputer
software . . . for the rapid, efficient lip synchronization and manipulation of
character facial expressions.”130 Although the district c ourt concluded that
“the claim adds to the prior art . . . the use of rules, rather than artists” to set
the proper modifications or “m orph weights and transitions between
phonemes,” the court nonetheless invalidated the patents because the claims
were too broad and not limited to specific rules.131 The court found that the
claims were unpatentable because “the novel portions of [the] invention are
claimed too broadly.”132 The Federal Circuit disagreed.
Criticizing the district court’s Sec. 101 analysis as one that “loosely
tracks” the Alice test, Judge Reyna, writing for the Court, reversed the order
for judgment on t he pleading an d held that the clai ms are patentable.133
Addressing the district court’s analysis, the McRO made clear that tangibility
is not dispositive. Indeed, “the result may not be tangible, there is nothin g
that requires a method “be tied to a machine or transform an article” to be
patentable.134 “The concern underl ying the exceptions to § 1 01 is n ot
tangibility, but preemption.”135 Here, the “claimed process uses a combined
order of specific rules that renders info rmation into a specific format that is
then used and applied to create desired results: a sequence of synchronized,
animated characters.”136 The district court oversimplified the asserted claims
by looking at them generally and then f ailing to account for those specific
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requirements of the claims.137 When the Federal Circuit did so, it concluded
that the asserted clai ms were, in fact, “lim ited to rules with specifi c
characteristics,” that is, “li mited to rules with certain co
mmon
characteristics, i.e. a genus.”138 Now, “[c]laims to the genus of an invention,
rather than a particular species , have long be en acknowledged as
patentable.”139 However, “ [p]atent law has evolved to place additional
requirements on patentees seeking to claim a genus; however, these limits
have not been in relation to the abstract idea exception to §101.”140 Rather,
the limits have been in relation to the risk of pree mption — th e primary
concern driving Sec. 101 jurisprudence. Because, the McRO patents, when
“looked at as a whole,” are “directed to a pat
entable, technological
improvement over the existing, manua l 3-D ani mation techniques,” there
was no risk of preemption.141
At first blush, there is no doubt t hat the McRO decision reiterated the
core principles espoused in Alice and its pr ogeny, namely, that claims
directed to specific im provements in co mputer technology are patenteligible. However, recall that the underlying theme of Alice jurisprudence is
a presumption of ineligibility where the patent claims a process that can be
carried out by a human using pen and paper by simply automating it.142 In
OIP Technologies, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’ s order
invalidating patents that relate to a method of p rice optimization in an
e-commerce environment. “At best,” Judge Hughe s writes, “th e claims
describe the automation of the fundamental economic concept of offer-based
price optimization through the use of generic-com puter functions.”143
Indeed, the “key distinguishing feature of the claims is the ability to automate
or otherwise make more efficient traditional price-optimization methods.”144
The Federal Circuit held that “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks
more quickly or m ore accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent
eligible.”145 Prior to McRO, it appeared the automation of human processes
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was not patentable. However, under McRO, the automation of an animator’s
tasks seems patent eligible so long as concerns of preemption are addressed.

V. Conclusion
Initially, the Federal Ci rcuit’s post-Alice jurisprudence carefully
avoided drawing bright-line tests, instead deciding individual cases under the
specific facts of those cases, with subsequent cases being argued by analogy
to previously decided cases. At last, after over two y ears of p ost-Alice
decisions, the broad strokes of an analy tical framework are st arting to
emerge, particularly from the Federal Circuit’s decisions over the last six
months. First, the Court will determine what distinguishes the invention
from the prior art. If the novel feature is the use of a com puter, the patent
will likely be invalid, whil e if the novel feature is a better com puter, the
patent will likely be valid.
Whether the Federal Circuit will continue to follow this path or change
course and attempt to harmonize past decisions into an analytical framework
(e.g., by attempting to define the boundaries of what constitutes an abstract
idea) remains to be seen and will be the subject of continuing analysis and
research by practitioners for years to come.

